Samuel L. Boyd v. Harmon City Inc., Matthew Hilton, Brinton R. Burbidge, Kirton, McConkie, and Bushnell, Michael Gottfredson, Nielsen and Senior, Terry Harmon, and Doreen Harmon : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Samuel L. Boyd v. Harmon City Inc., Matthew
Hilton, Brinton R. Burbidge, Kirton, McConkie,
and Bushnell, Michael Gottfredson, Nielsen and
Senior, Terry Harmon, and Doreen Harmon : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blake T. Ostler; Kirton and McConkie; Arthur H. Nielsen; Nielsen and Senior; Thomas L. Kay; Snell
and Wilmer; Glenn C. Hanni; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Defendants.
Jeffrey M. Jones; J. Mark Gibb; Durham, Evans, jones & Pinegar; Attorneys for Boyd.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Boyd v. Harmon City Inc, No. 960197 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/137
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, 
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE, KIRTON, 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah 
corporation, MICHAEL 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON 
and DOREEN HARMON, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No.960197-CA 
Priority 15 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCU. I I .T 
KFU 
50 
DOCKET NO. . ^ 1 9 ? TA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES HARMONS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
50 S. Main Street, #850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Samuel L. Boyd 
Blake T. Ostler (4642) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Thomas L. Kay 
SNELL & WILMER 
111 East Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FILED 
APR 1 0 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, 
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE, KIRTON, 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah 
corporation, MICHAEL 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON 
and DOREEN HARMON, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No.960197-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES HARMONS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
50 S. Main Street, #850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Samuel L. Boyd 
Blake T. Ostler (4642) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Thomas L. Kay 
SNELL & WILMER 
111 East Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
II. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 1 
HI. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 1 
IV 2 
B. Statement of Facts. 4 
1. Facts Relevant to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Prosecution 4 
2. Facts Relevant to Motion to Dismiss Utah Uniform 
Securities Act Claim (Fourth Claim) 6 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
VI. ARGUMENT 8 
THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
INCIDENT TO NEGOTIATION TO PURCHASE SECURITIES UNDER 
THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 8 
VII. CONCLUSION . 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 
343 U.S. 956 (1952) . 11 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723 (1975) 10 
Grubb v. F.D.I.C, 
868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989) . 1 1 
Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 
45 WashApp. 502 P.2d 597 (1986) 10 
Levitz v. Warrinton, 
877 P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 1994) 9, 10 
Marcus v. Shapiro, Abramson & Schwimmer, 
620 So.2d 1284 (Fla.Ct.App. 4 Dist. 1993) 10 
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 
529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) 8, 11 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 
811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 1 
Wilson v. Lamber, 
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980) 1 
Other Authorities Page 
Section 61-l-22(l)(a) 11 
Utah's Uniform Securities Act, §§ 61-1-1 et seq 1, 9-11 
- ii -
The Defendants Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon (the 
"Harmons") respectfully submit this Harmons Appellees' Brief. 
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents the following issues: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs case with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute? The disposition of a motion for failure to prosecute rests 
with the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a showing of 
abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Lamber, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Appellants Fourth Claim alleging violation 
of Utah's Uniform Securities Act when there was no actual sale, or purchase of any securities 
but merely negotiations? This issue presents a question of law which the Court reviews 
under the standard of correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 
194 (Utah 1991). 
II. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1995). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The Appellant's Fourth Claim is governed by Utah's Uniform Securities Act, §§ 61-1-1 
et seq. The Appellant has asserted claims to recover costs in connection with negotiations 
exploring the possibility of purchasing Harmon City, Inc. ("HO") a Utah corporation. 
Specifically, the Appellant claims a violation of § 61-1-1(2) U.C.A. which states: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, 
or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, to: 
**** 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading. 
The remedy for violation of § 61-1-1(2) is found at § 62-1-22 U.C.A. which provides 
in relevant part: 
(l)(a) A person who . . . offers, sells or purchases a security in 
violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person selling 
the security to or buying the security from him, who may sue 
either at law or at equity to recover the consideration paid for 
the security, together with interest at 12% per year from the 
date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, less the 
amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender 
of the security or for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon 
a tender less the value of the security when the buyer disposed 
of it and interest at 12% per year from the date of disposition. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of this Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
More than a decade ago in 1986, Appellant Sam Boyd ("Boyd") contacted the 
Harmons and initiated discussions to explore the possibility of purchasing Harmon City, Inc. 
("HO"). The discussions continued for several months. However, prior to a scheduled 
closing date, Boyd broke off negotiations, ostensibly due to concerns regarding potential 
liability in connection with the Harmon City Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the "Plan") under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). The potential Plan liability was fully 
disclosed to Boyd. That is why he broke off negotiations. There was never a sale or 
purchase of any securities consummated. Boyd never paid any money to purchase HCI stock. 
There was never an agreement requiring the sale, transfer or purchase of any HCI stock. 
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Boyd was upset that he spent time and money exploring the possibility of purchasing 
HCL He thus brought this action to recover expenses incurred in pursuing those 
negotiations. 
The Complaint was initially filed in the State of Texas on 12 September 1988, After 
motions to remove to Federal Court in Texas were defeated, the Defendants (except for 
Texas resident Ronnie Hon), moved to dismiss the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. 
Depositions of several persons were taken by the Defendants in the Texas action limited to 
issues relevant to in personam jurisdiction of the court over the Defendants. The Texas State 
Court granted the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction on 9 
May 1991. On 11 March 1992, the Appellee/Defendants in the Texas action filed a Motion 
to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas 
at Dallas, No. 05-91-01110-CV. Boyd abandoned his appeal at that point. 
After Boyd abandoned his appeal in Texas, he filed this action in Utah on 16 March 
1992. The original Complaint was never served. About four months later, on 10 July 1992, 
Boyd filed an Amended Complaint and had it served on all Defendants except Michael 
Gottfredson who apparently was never served in this matter. On 31 July 1992, the Harmons 
Defendants were the first among the Defendants to file a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth 
Claim. The other Defendants all filed Motions to Dismiss shortly thereafter. On 23 
February 1993, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Claim and denied the 
remainder of the Motions to Dismiss. On 26 April 1993, the Harmons Defendants filed an 
Answer to Amended Complaint. From that time until 26 January 1995 when the Defendants 
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, the Harmons Defendants had no contact 
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from Boyd. Boyd did absolutely nothing to move the case forward. However, when Boyd 
received the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, he rushed to the courthouse to file 
a request for a scheduling conference and filed voluminous discovery requests. The Harmons 
Defendants responded to Requests to Admit subject to the objection that the Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute should first be decided. (R. 430-31) On 16 June 1995, Judge 
Leslie Lewis entered an order dismissing Boyd's Utah case for failure to prosecute. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Facts Relevant to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution. The Harmons 
primarily rely on the facts set forth by Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell and Brinton R. 
Burbidge with respect to the Plaintiffs failure to prosecute. However, the Harmons add to 
those facts the following: 
a. Appellant Samuel L. Boyd is an attorney who resides in Texas. (R. 393,112) 
b. Boyd initially filed the Complaint in this matter on 10 March 1992. 
However, that Complaint was never served on any party. (R. 1-8). 
c. Boyd filed an Amended Complaint on 10 July 1992. (R. 10). 
d. On 31 July 1992, the Harmons Defendants were the first among the 
Defendants to file a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Claim of the Amended Complaint. (R. 
38-40). 
e. On 23 February 1993, the lower court granted the Motion to Dismiss the 
Fourth Claim. (R. 223-28). 
f. Unlike some of the other Defendants with whom the Plaintiff claims to have 
had some contact or discussion regarding this case, the Harmons were never once contacted 
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by the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs counsel during the entire pendency of this action. There have 
been no settlement discussions, no explorations, no status discussions - absolutely no contact 
from the Plaintiff or any act to pursue this case since it was filed in Utah. 
g. The Harmons were the first to file for dismissal of the Fourth Claim in 
response to the Plaintiffs Complaint. It was the Harmons' Memorandum and Motion that 
resulted in the successful dismissal of the Fourth Claim at the trial court level. The other 
parties joined in the Harmons' Memoranda regarding that point. 
h. Because the Harmons had undertaken the burden with respect to the 
Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Claim, it was decided among counsel for the Defendants that 
attorneys for Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell and Brinton R. Burbidge would draft the 
Memoranda and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and the Harmons would join. 
After the Defendant Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell filed its initial Memorandum to Dismiss 
for Failure to Prosecute, the Plaintiff rushed to the Courthouse to file a request for a 
scheduling conference to try to stave off the failure to pursue this case for more than two 
years. While the Harmons joined in the Motion one day after the Appellant's mad dash to 
the Courthouse, the Harmons joined in the Motion before having received anything from the 
Plaintiff. The Harmons acted in concert with the other Defendants before the Plaintiff did 
anything to move the litigation forward. 
i. The Harmons Defendants were prejudiced by the Plaintiffs interminable 
delays and failure to prosecute as follows: 
(1) HCI expended more than $5,000 with respect to monitoring and 
defense of the matter; 
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(2) HCI incurred costs and expenses due the pendency of the matter 
to retain accountants and attorneys to review material loss contingencies on an annual basis 
and assess them from both a legal and accounting perspective; 
(3) The insurance rating of HCI was affected by the disclosure of 
material loss contingency as a result of this matter; and 
(4) The HCI credit rating was impaired by disclosure of the matter. (R. 
633-34) 
2. Facts Relevant to Motion to Dismiss Utah Uniform Securities Act Claim (Fourth 
Claim). The facts relevant to the Fourth Claim arising out of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act are as follows: 
a. In 1986, the Harmons and Samuel L. Boyd as an individual entered into 
discussions to explore the possibility of Boyd's purchase of Harmon City, Inc., the corporation 
which owns the popular grocery chain having its principal offices in West Valley City. (R. 12-
13). 
b. A letter agreement was entered pursuant to which Boyd would explore the 
possibility of purchasing HCI stock and Boyd "made preparation for the acquisition" of HCI 
by engaging Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. (R. 12, 11 16). 
c. Boyd broke off negotiations and refused to pursue purchase of HCI after 
he learned that there may be claims associated with the HCI Profit Sharing Plan. (R. 12, U 
18; 366, 396, HU 21-23).1 Boyd learned of the then merely potential HCI Profit Sharing Plan 
1
 The claim in the Appellant's Brief that "Harmon City has admitted that it failed to 
make a material disclosure to Boyd relating to its mishandling of Harmon City employees' 
pension/ERISA funds before the sale of Harmon City stock to Boyd" is a blatant 
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liability prior to any closing of a sale of HCI stock and refused to pursue negotiations or 
purchase HCI's stock. (Id.; R. 12-13) 
d. There was never an actual sale or exchange of any securities. The 
transaction never advanced beyond the stage of "negotiating for the sale of Harmon City Inc." 
-- to use Boyd's own words. (R. 396, K 21). 
e. There was never a contract entered which obligated HCI to sell or transfer 
any securities to Boyd. There was a written contract between the parties which governed the 
negotiations to explore a sale or transfer of HCI stock to Boyd; but no agreement was ever 
reached which required such sell or transfer. (R. 12, Us 16-17) 
f. The Plaintiff Boyd seeks to recover only costs incident to "negotiating for 
the sale of Harmon City, Inc. with the various defendants" rather than damages resulting 
from an actual sale or transfer because there was no actual sale or transfer (R. 396, H 22). 
There were only preliminary negotiations. As the Plaintiff Boyd admits: "Shortly before the 
acquisition was to close, Boyd discovered . . . Terry Harmon's mishandling of Harmon City's 
misrepresentation and lie which ought to be sanctioned under Rule 11. (Appellant's Brief at 
17). The Plaintiff cites Harmons Response to Requests to Admit No. 6 where the Harmons 
stated: "The Harmons Defendants object to Request No. 6 on the grounds that it is too 
vague to form a coherent request. Without waiving the foregoing objection, the Harmons 
Defendants admit that the U.S. Department of Labor concluded that violations of ERISA 
had occurred and brought suit in the United States District court for the District of Utah. 
However, the Harmons Defendants deny that any final determination was made to establish 
such alleged violations." (R. 432-33). In fact the Harmons never admitted anything about 
an alleged failure to disclose the potential ERISA problems to Boyd and have always 
maintained that the potential ERISA liability was fully disclosed to Boyd very early in the 
negotiations. (R. 438, Response to Request to Admit No. 29). Indeed, that is the reason that 
Boyd refused to pursue negotiations any further. (R. 366). He broke off negotiations prior 
to any sale or transfer of any securities. Boyd's attempt to mislead this Court to believe that 
somehow a "sale of Harmon City stock" took place is a contemptible distortion of the facts 
and record in this case. (See Appellee's Brief at 17). 
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employee pension/ERISA funds." ( Appellants Brief at 6 U 2). Boyd admits: ". . . . 
consequently, the acquisition did not close." (Appellants Brief at 7). All of the alleged 
damages were incurred "in the course of negotiations with the various defendants to purchase 
Harmon City... ." (Id. H 3). The Appellant states: "Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does 
not consider the very significant expense incurred by me in negotiating the purchase of 
Harmon City, Inc., which is the basis for my claims in this lawsuit." (R. 396, 1f 21). 
g. The Appellant Boyd did not pay any consideration for any security which 
he purchased from any of the Defendants/Appellees. No securities were ever sold or 
transferred to him by the Defendants/Appellees. Boyd never purchased any HCI stock and 
could not tender any HCI securities because he never owned any. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The controlling statute under which the Appellant has asserted his Fourth Claim, 
§ 61-1-22 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, requires that a Plaintiff is an actual of 
securities. Because the Plaintiff is not an actual purchaser of securities, the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act does not provide a remedy for the Plaintiffs claim. Further, the Plaintiff has 
no standing to assert securities fraud in the absence of an actual purchase of securities. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES INCIDENT TO NEGOTIATION TO PURCHASE 
SECURITIES UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT. 
It is well settled that there is no private right of action for damages under §§ 61-1-1 
et seq. U.C.A. in the absence of an actual purchase or sale of securities. As the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974): 
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The plaintiffs claim that the defendant Elmer Fox & Co. is 
liable to the plaintiffs for damages under section 61-1-1, U.C.A., 
1953, by reason of the omission and inaccuracies contained in 
the financial reports prepared by it. While that section makes 
certain practices unlawful, it does not provide a private right of 
action for its violation. The plaintiffs urge this court to fashion 
a remedy, but we are of the opinion that it is a matter best left 
to the legislature. 
The sole remedies provided for violation of § 61-1-1(2) are recovery of "the 
consideration paid for the security" together with interest and fees, "or for damages if [the 
owner] no longer owns the security." § 61-l-22(l)(a), U.C.A. "Damages" are defined as "the 
amount that would be recoverable upon tender less the value of the security when the buyer 
disposed of it" together with interest. These statutes require that a person bringing suit must 
actually have parted with consideration for the security or must have actually disposed of the 
security after having owned it. There is no remedy to recover consequential or incidental 
damages in connection with costs of negotiation of a "failed purchase" of securities - as Mr. 
Boyd phrases it. (R. 366). 
Section 61-l-22(l)(a) provides that a person selling the security can only be liable to 
"the person selling the security to or buying the security from him." This Court has recently 
interpreted this statute to limit claims for violation of Utah's Uniform Securities Act to actual 
buyers and sellers of securities ~ not to mere potential purchasers. In Levitz v. Wartinton, 
877 P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 1994), an investor who had actually parted with consideration to 
purchase securities but who reserved the right to seek return of the consideration was held 
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to not have standing to assert a claim under Utah's Uniform Securities Act in the absence 
of an actual sale or purchase of securities.2 This Court stated: 
A person is liable under section [61-l-22(l)(a)j for offering, 
buying, or selling a security by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fact. Id. at § 61-l-22(l)(a). The remedy under this 
section, however, is limited "to the person selling . . . or buying 
the security." See Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 45 
Wash App. 502, 728 P.2d 597, 606 (1986) (interpreting statutory 
language substantially similar to our own); see also Marcus v. 
Shapiro, Abramson & Schwimmer, 620 So.2d 1284, 1285-86 
(Fla.Ct.App. 4 Dist. 1993). 
The Interlake court noted that "this limitation is in uniformity 
with the law in other states which . . . have adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act." Reading the section to limit causes of action to 
actual buyers and sellers is also in accord with the federal 
Securities Act. 
Id. at 1246. 
As this Court noted in its Levitz decision, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
All U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal 
Securities Act to require that a plaintiff must be an actual purchaser or seller of securities 
"and not merely a potential purchaser to have a cause of action under the Securities Act." Id. 
The Blue Chip court declined to make an exception to this rule to allow mere offerees and 
potential purchasers to seek damages. Id. at 1247. The Court found that it did not want to 
subject the "actual buyer or purchaser rule" to a case-by-case erosion. Id. 
The Utah Uniform Securities Act must be interpreted and administered consistently 
"with the federal regulation." § 61-1-27, U.CA. It has long been the rule under the identical 
2
 This Court remanded the case for further findings to determine whether an actual sale 
or purchase of securities had occurred. 
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Federal Regulation 10b-5 (§10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) that a party 
bringing a private action to recover damages "must be an actual purchaser or seller of 
securities." Grubb v. FD.LC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 1989); citing Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp. 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
It is undisputed that Boyd never purchased and Defendants/Appellees did not sell any 
HCI stock. Because Boyd never actually purchased HCI stock, it follows that he does not 
have standing to recover under Utah's Uniform Securities Act. Boyd has tried to avoid this 
conclusion by referring to "an executory" contract for the purchase or sell of securities. 
(Appellant's Brief at 32 n. 60). However, it is not alleged by Boyd that an actual contract 
to purchase was entered; rather, it is alleged merely that a contract to negotiate and to 
explore a potential sale of stock had been entered. The contract upon which Boyd sues does 
not have any provision for the actual sale or disposition of any stock owned by any of the 
Appellees in this action. Rather, the agreement upon which Boyd relies specifically provided 
that any agreement to actually sell stock would have to be consummated by a future 
agreement. For this reason, Boyd does not have standing under "the Birnbaum Rule" to seek 
damages under Utah's Uniform Securities Act. 
It is undisputed that Boyd did not part with any consideration to purchase HCI stock. 
There was never an actual sale or purchase. Boyd was a mere potential purchaser who 
refused to close any agreement related to negotiations to purchase HCI stock because he 
alleges that he discovered that there may be potential liability arising from dealings with the 
HCI Profit Sharing Plan. Section 61-l-22(l)(a) does not provide any remedy for such 
potential purchasers. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 
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supra, it is for the legislature and not for the courts to fashion remedies under the Uniform 
Securities Act. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is well settled that there is no private right of action by a merely potential purchaser 
to maintain an action under Utah's Uniform Securities Act. Boyd seeks to recover only 
consequential and incidental damages in connection with negotiations to explore purchase 
of HCI stock. However, the remedies provided under § 61-l-22(l)(a) expressly include only 
return of the consideration paid to actually purchase the security or damages after having 
parted with the actually purchased security. Boyd did not actually purchase any securities 
from any of the Appellees. Boyd did not enter into a contract which actually provided for 
the sale or disposition of stock. Rather, the contract between the parties merely required the 
parties to negotiate an agreement which, if entered at some future time, would result in the 
sale of HCI's stock. However, that future agreement was not in fact entered by the parties. 
By Boyd's own admission, he ultimately broke off negotiations and refused to consummate 
any transaction to purchase HCI stock because potential liability arising in connection HCI's 
Profit Sharing Plan was disclosed to him prior to any closing. Therefore, the lower court 
properly dismissed Boyd's Fourth Claim on the grounds that Boyd was not an actual 
purchaser of stock. 
DATED this day of April, 1996. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Blake T. Cfctler 
Attorneys for the Harmons Defendants 
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